War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by Julie Fedor Markku Kangaspuro Jussi Lassila & Tatiana Zhurzhenko

War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus by Julie Fedor Markku Kangaspuro Jussi Lassila & Tatiana Zhurzhenko

Author:Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila & Tatiana Zhurzhenko
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham


Transnational Links: Symbolically Regaining an Imperial Narrative

The Stalin Line was initiated as a transnational project re-establishing partially lost links with veterans in Kazakhstan , Russia and beyond. 40 In particular the event “We are the Successors of the Great Victory!” was an international project, initiated during the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2005 (“Memorial’nye znaki” 2013). In the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War as initiated by Afghan veterans in independent Belarus a strong transnational link between the practices of memory politics in different post-Soviet republics becomes visible. The process of the public recollection of Soviet warfare in regard to both Stalin and the Soviet war in Afghanistan has the effect of putting a post-imperial interpretation of history on the public agenda. 41 This explains both the reintroduction of Stalin as Generalissimus, understood as a legitimate reaction to his symbolic disappearance in the 1960s, and the questioning of his role as Soviet leader that started in the 1980s and developed in the 1990s (Vujacic 2009). It also explains the blending of World War II narratives and the Soviet war experience in Afghanistan in order to transfer some of the symbolic legacy and legitimacy of the Soviet victory in World War II to the disasters of the lost Soviet war in Afghanistan . This public support by CIS state figures is aimed at raising legitimacy. 42 By definition the introduction of this post-Soviet narrative is a means of symbolically regaining some of the strength of the Soviet Union ; as such it is not based on national narratives in the sense of ethno-nationalist approaches as were partly introduced in the early 1990s in Belarus, Ukraine, and other former Soviet republics. 43 The reinternationalization of the internationalist-warriors, as the Afghanistan veterans refer to themselves, is formalized in organizations such as the International Union “Battle Brotherhood” which brings together high-ranking officials from various former Soviet Republics. On the other hand, the image of discontinuity in the transnationalization of the war is misleading. The first unionwide meeting was organized as early as 1987 during the Soviet war in Afghanistan . In 1990 this all-union event took place in Minsk . 44 Some of the links created during the war and in its direct aftermath had to be re-established, but the network created in the 1980s was still in existence. Its function changed during the 1990s, and it was only in the twenty-first century that political responsibility for the patriotic education of youth was placed upon formal organizations.

The Stalin Line’s official publication—a high-quality glossy color book with large pictures and patriotic texts—has a preface by the Russian politician Pavel Borodin, head of a formally existing Belarusian–Russian Union state. Even if this state had little real impact on the deepening of transnational links, Borodin is clearly perceived to be a relevant figure in regard to the commemoration of the Stalin Line . 45 His statement makes clear that the experience itself is perceived in general Soviet terms: “Our Belarusian friends have shown once again that the memory of the Great Patriotic War is meaningful for them.



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